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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Christopher Eric Grifﬁn,

Jr.,

appeals from his judgment 0f conviction on a single charge

of attempted arson in the third degree, entered pursuant t0 a conditional guilty plea.
he challenges three

pre-trial determinations: the denial

employ a struck jury, the denial 0f his motion
motion

of his motion for the

to bifurcate charges,

On

appeal,

district court to

and the granting of the

state’s

t0 exclude certain expert testimony.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Christopher Eric Grifﬁn,

Jr.,

was charged by complaint with arson

in the third degree

and

attempted arson in the third degree. (R., pp. 19-21.) The complaint alleged that Grifﬁn set ﬁre t0
the sidewalk outside 0f the

commit arson by
At

T11, p. 32, L.

ofﬁcer was called t0 interview Grifﬁn,
p.43, L. 9.)

23 —

glass, a charred piece

p. 36, L. 4.1)

Who had been

The next

arrested as a suspect.

1

him

unfairly.

day,

0f

0n June

fabric,

15, the

(8/2/17 Tr., p. 38, L.

After waiving his Miranda rights, Grifﬁn admitted to having “let off” a

“Molotov cocktail” on June 14 because he was “disgruntled” With a judge
treated

morning hours 0f June

Video recorded someone setting off an explosive device 0n the sidewalk outside

Bannock County Courthouse, leaving a burn mark, broken

—

2017, and then attempted to

ﬁlling a beer bottle with gasoline the following day. (Id.)

and the smell 0f gasoline. (8/2/17

11

14,

the probable cause hearing, an ofﬁcer testiﬁed that, in the early

14, surveillance

the

Bannock County Courthouse 0n June

(Id.)

He

whom he believed had

also admitted to ﬁlling a beer bottle With gasoline at a gas station

References to ‘8/2/17 Tr.’ are t0 the transcript 0f the probable cause hearing, conducted 0n that

date,

and contained

Volume

1.”

at

pages 28-42 of the ﬁle

titled

"Appeal-Genera1-Conﬁdential Exhibits

early that morning,

0n June

15,

With the intent 0f doing the same thing again.

attendant testiﬁed that Grifﬁn purchased a small

0n June

14,

though he had no

car.

amount 0f gasoline

(8/2/17 T11, p. 6, L. 11

—

at

p. 9, L. 21.)

A gas station

(Id.)

approximately four a.m.

She testiﬁed

that

Grifﬁn

returned after midnight the next day, in the early morning of June 15, and entered the gas station

with an open bottle of gasoline in his hand,
18, L. 19

— p.

at

which point she called the

police.

(8/2/17 Tr., p.

25, L. 14.)

After the magistrate court found probable cause (R., pp. 65-66), the prosecutor ﬁled an

information charging arson in the third degree and attempted arson in the third degree (R., pp.

The information was

68-69).

degree. (R., pp. 210-1

Prior to

trial,

district court “to

later

amended

two counts of attempted arson

Grifﬁn made two motions relevant to

conduct the jury selection process by
is

the

Second, less than a week before

Code
trial

sections 2-201

was

this appeal.

way 0f a

method and manner outlined

pp. 107-08.) In support, he cited Idaho

set t0

in the

made one motion

is

0n the grounds

that

law and criminal rules.”

(R.,

— 206, and Idaho Criminal Rule

trials

24.

(R., p. 361),

0n the grounds 0f unfair

same jury.”

(R., pp. 397-98.)

relevant to this appeal: t0 exclude testimony from Grifﬁn’s

proposed expert “for the reason that
defendant

he moved the

begin 0n August 14, 2018

prejudice to the Defendant if both charges are tried before the

state

First,

struck jury”

Grifﬁn moved t0 “bifurcate the two criminal charges into separate

The

in the third

1.)

“the struck jury process

(Id.)

to charge

this

Witness Will testify concrete cannot burn, however the

charged with an Attempt charge, thus an actual burning

isn’t necessary.”

(R., pp.

381-82.)

The

district court

ofjury selection.

heard arguments and resolved the motions

at a

hearing on the morning

On

the motion to bifurcate, Grifﬁn’s attorney stated, “It’s our fear that hearing the

evidence as related to one date will overlap and create a presumption 0f guilty against Mr. Grifﬁn

With regard to the second charge.” (8/13/18

motion days before

When

trial

The

state

I

16-22?) Asked

had been pending

the case

responded, “Because that’s the tactic

Tr., p. 5, L.

Why he was making

the

for over a year, Grifﬁn’s attorney

chose t0 pursue.” (8/13/18

Tr., p. 5, L.

23 —

p. 6, L. 2.)

argued that the counts should be resolved by the same jury because they involved the

same evidence.

(8/13/18 Tr., p.

The

6, Ls. 4-19.)

district court agreed,

noted that

it

would

provide an instruction t0 the jury to consider the counts separately to reduce any potential for
prejudice, and denied the motion. (8/13/18 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 20-25.)

On

the motion for struck jury, Grifﬁn’s attorney stated that “the process the court intends

to use is a Violation

of the statute and the rules regarding selection 0f the jury. In

the selection of a broad p001,

them.”

Which

(8/13/18 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 2-11.)

requirements.”

The

(Id.)

is

the initial 60, and then the struck jury

He

district court

claimed that “any other play

is

Finally, with respect to the state’s

motion

expert witness, the state argued that because

it

is

its

requires

drawn from

in Violation

denied the motion, concluding that

process complied With the applicable law. (8/13/18 Tr., p.

[sic]

of those

jury selection

7, Ls. 16-25.)

to exclude testimony

from Grifﬁn’s proposed

was pursuing only attempted arson

counts,

it

did

not have to prove that he “actually bum[ed] something 0r could [have] actually burn[ed]

something; just that he tried to go forward with a plan t0 burn something.” (8/13/18

23 —

2

p. 14, L. 14.)

As

a result, testimony regarding the combustibility 0f cement

References t0 ‘8/13/18

plea,

Tr.’ are t0 the transcript

0f the hearing 0n

conducted 0n that date, and contained in the ﬁle

Transcripts

Volume

1.”

titled

pre-trial

Tr., p. 13, L.

was

irrelevant.

motions and entry 0f

"Appeal-General-Reporter’s

(Id.)

In response, Grifﬁn argued that the testimony

was

relevant because “you can’t have an

attempt to commit a crime that cannot be committed.” (8/13/18 Tr., p. 14, L. 18

The
it

district court

—

p. 15, L. 2.)

granted the state’s motion, concluding that the evidence was irrelevant because

was being offered only

t0 support a defense

0f impossibility that was not available for an

attempt charge under Idaho law. (8/13/18 Tr., p. 21, L. 14

— p.

22, L. 19.)

After the district court ruled, the parties informed the court that they had reached a
conditional plea agreement pursuant to Which Grifﬁn

would plead

guilty t0 one count 0f

attempted arson in the third degree and the state would dismiss the other count. (8/13/18
31, L. 25

—

p. 32, L. 13.)

Grifﬁn reserved the right t0 appeal the

regarding the impossibility defense. (8/13/18 Tr., p. 34, L. 19

— p.

district court’s

35, L. 13.

m

determination

alﬂ

Grifﬁn was sentenced to a uniﬁed term of ﬁve years, with three years ﬁxed.

The
(Id.)

district court

He

Tr., p.

R., p. 438.)

(R., p.

45 1 .)

suspended that sentence and placed him 0n probation for a period 0f four years.

timely appealed. (R., pp. 454-57.)

IS SUES

Grifﬁn

states the issues

I.

Did the

II.

Did

0n appeal

district court err

as:

by denying Mr. Grifﬁn’s motion

for a struck jury?

by excluding Mr. Grifﬁn’s proposed expert
determined that impossibility was not a defense at an

the district court err

testimony

when

it

attempt crime?

Did the

III.

district court err

by denying

the motion t0 bifurcate the charges?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 3)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Did Grifﬁn waive
jury and

2.

Even

if

its

his right to appeal the district court’s denial

denial 0f his motion to bifurcate the charges?

Grifﬁn did not waive the right t0 appeal the denial 0f his motion for a struck jury,

has Grifﬁn failed to show that the

3.

Even

if

district court erred in

denying that motion?

Grifﬁn did not waive the right t0 appeal the denial of his motion t0 biﬁlrcate

charges, has Grifﬁn failed to

4.

0f his motion for a struck

Has Grifﬁn

failed t0

show

show

that the district court erred in

that the district court erred

be offered only to support a defense that
law?

is

denying that motion?

by excluding evidence

that

was

t0

not available t0 an attempt charge under Idaho

ARGUMENT
I.

BV Operation Of His Guilty Plea, Grifﬁn Waived His Right To Appeal The District
Denial Of His Motions T0 Bifurcate Charges And For A Struck Jury
A.

Court’s

Introduction

Grifﬁn accepted a conditional guilty plea, reserving only the right to appeal from the
district court’s

determination that Idaho law does not permit a defense of impossibility t0 an

attempt charge and that certain evidence relevant only t0 that defense should be excluded.
(8/13/18 Tr., p. 34, L. 19

t0 appeal

any other

t0 bifurcate charges

B.

Standard

— p.

issues,

35, L. 13.

E

alﬂ

R., p. 438.)

he waived his right to appeal the

Because he did not reserve the right
district court’s denial

0f his motions

and for use of a struck jury.

Of Review

A waiver of the right t0 appeal an issue will be upheld so long as “the entire record shows
the waiver

was made

voluntarily,

knowingly and

intelligently.”

State V.

Mugphy, 125 Idaho 456,

457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994).

C.

And Therefore Waived, The Right To Appeal The
His Motion To Biﬁlrcate And The Denial Of His Motion For A Struck Jury
Grifﬁn Did Not Reserve,

A

Denial

Of

guilty plea ordinarily constitutes a waiver 0f all non-jurisdictional defects in the trial

proceedings.

State V. Kelchner, 130 Idaho 37, 39,

936 P.2d 680, 682 (1997). Such defects can

be preserved for appellate review only by entering a conditional guilty plea pursuant t0 I.C.R.
11(a)(2).

Li

With

I.C.R. 11(a)(2) provides:

the approval 0f the court and the consent 0f the prosecuting attorney, a

defendant

may

enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving in writing the right,

on

appeal from the judgment, t0 review any speciﬁed adverse ruling. If the defendant
prevails

on appeal, the defendant must be allowed

t0

withdraw defendant’s

plea.

A

failure to

comply with the requirements of

properly reserved for appellate review.

E,

I.C.R. 11(a)(2) results in waiver of

State V. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 889, 11 P.3d

gg,

1101, 1107 (2000) (issue of alleged mishandling of evidence

Where issue had not been reserved

guilty plea,

any issues not

was waived by Hosey’s conditional

for review in writing); State V. Salinas, 134 Idaho

362, 367, 2 P.3d 747, 752 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an I.C.R. 11(a)(2) conditional guilty plea
requires the consent 0f the prosecutor, and that Salinas did not preserve his right t0 present a

speedy

trial

guilty plea

issue

was

0n

direct appeal

When

the only adverse ruling he speciﬁed in his conditional

the district court’s denial 0f his motion to suppress).

Grifﬁn reserved only the right to appeal the

district court’s

determination that evidence

regarding the combustibility of cement, offered to support an impossibility defense, was
irrelevant in light of the fact that there is

Idaho law. (8/13/18

T11, p. 34, L.

19

— p.

n0 impossibility defense

35, L. 13.

the plea agreement and his associated plea

E

were entered

and Grifﬁn does not contend otherwise. (8/13/18

t0

an attempt charge under

211$ R., p. 438.)

The record reﬂects

voluntarily, knowingly,

Tr., p. 45, Ls. 15-21.)

and

that

intelligently,

Because Grifﬁn did not

reserve the right t0 appeal the denial of his motions t0 biﬁlrcate the charges and for use 0f a

struck jury, he

waived the

right t0 appeal those issues

by Virtue 0f his

plea.

II

Even

If Grifﬁn

The
A.

Had Not Waived The Right T0 Appeal The Issue, Grifﬁn Has Not Shown That
District Court Erred BV Denying His Motion To Use A Struck Jury

Introduction

Grifﬁn ﬁled a Motion for a Struck Jury, arguing that under Idaho Code sections 2-201 —

206 and Idaho Criminal Rule 24, “the struck jury process
the law and criminal rules”

(R., pp. 107-08),

and

that

is

the

method and manner outlined

employing any other method

is

in

unlawﬁll

(8/13/18 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 2-1

struck jury

is

district court correctly

not mandated by Idaho law. (8/13/18 Tr., p.

Standard

B.

The

1).

for voir dire

and the selection of competent jurors

the trial judge.” State V. Merriﬁeld, 109 Idaho 11, 16,

is

The

704 P.2d 343, 348

(Ct.

rests

upon

App. 1985). “Thus,

given broad discretion in supervision 0f the jury selection process t0 ensure that

a panel of competent jurors

C.

7, Ls. 16-25.)

Of Review

“The primary responsibility

the trial judge

denied the motion because the use 0f a

District

is

selected.” Li.

Court Did Not Abuse

Its

Discretion

BV Refusing T0 Employ A

Struck Jury

Grifﬁn’s argument below that the district court was required t0 employ a struck jury was

based exclusively on Idaho Code sections 2-201 — 206, and Idaho Criminal Rule 24.
107-08.)

On

addresses,

much

appeal, he acknowledges that nothing in Idaho

less requires, the

Idaho Criminal Rule 24

that

it

at least

does not require such use.
In a provision titled

use 0f a struck jury.

Code

(R., pp.

— 206

sections 2-201

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.)

Though

addresses the use 0f a struck jury, Grifﬁn likewise acknowledges

(Id.)

“Use 0f a Struck Jury,” Idaho Criminal Rule 24

states that:

The court may cause a panel ofjurors t0 be questioned and passed for cause in a
number equal t0 the number ofjurors and alternates required for the ﬁnal jury and
an additional number equal t0 the number 0f peremptory challenges 0f the parties.
Prospective jurors When chosen must be seated in a manner s0 as t0 be numbered
with the lower numbered jurors constituting the initial panel and alternate jurors,
and the subsequent numbered jurors becoming the replacement jurors if any of the
jurors 0f the original panel are removed by a peremptory challenge.
I.C.R. 24(f) (emphasis added).

As Grifﬁn acknowledges,

this

Court has “held that the use 0f the

denotes discretion.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5 (quoting

word ‘may’

rather than the

Walborn

Walborn, 120 Idaho 494, 500-01, 817 P.2d 160, 166-67 (1991).)

V.

word

‘shall’

Thus, Idaho

Criminal Rule 24 does not require that that method ofjury selection be employed, but permits the
district court t0

do

so.

Idaho Code section 19-2030 likewise provides

number ofjurors Who

may be

exercise their peremptory challenges.”

discretion whether to

until the statute

number ofjurors representing

Will hear the case, plus a

possible peremptory challenges,

called and

examined

In fact, far

to provide district courts

prohibited the use 0f a struck jury.

E

of the court, the

the total

number of

for cause before the parties begin to

That provision explicitly provides the

employ a struck jury.

was amended

that, “in the discretion

district court

with

from mandating the use 0f a struck jury,
with the discretion t0 d0

State V. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 396,

so,

Idaho law

807 P.2d 610, 614

(1991) (noting that use of a struck jury was prohibited until Idaho Code section 19-2030 and
I.C.R.

24 were amended

to permit trial courts the discretion to

Grifﬁn alleged in passing that the procedure the
jury

was unlawful, but did not explain how

identiﬁed above.

jury

(8/13/18 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 2-1

was required by Idaho

law.

1.)

it

district court

intended t0 use to select a

was unlawful except

t0 cite the provisions

His only argument was that the use of a struck

(R., pp. 107-08.)

Mindful 0f the applicable rules and case law,

he makes the same argument on appeal. (Appellant’s
require the use 0f a struck jury, his argument

employ struck juries).

brief, p. 5.)

Because Idaho law does not

fails.

III.

Even

A.

If Grifﬁn

Did Not Waive His Right To Appeal The Denial Of His Motion T0
The District Court Did Not Err In Denying That Motion

Bifurcate,

Introduction

Grifﬁn argued below that the

district court

should “bifurcate the charges” because the

defense “fear[ed] that hearing the evidence as related t0 one date Will overlap and create a

presumption of guilt against Mr. Grifﬁn with regard t0 the second charge.” (8/13/18 TL,
16-22.)

Asked why Grifﬁn ﬁled

his

motion

less than a

week

pending for over a year, his attorney responded, “Because
(8/13/18 Tr., p. 5, L. 23

the

— p.

6, L. 2.)

The

same evidence would be introduced

district court

state

before

trial

when

that’s the tactic

I

the case

p. 5, Ls.

had been

chose t0 pursue.”

argued that the motion should be denied because

to support both counts. (8/13/18 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 5-19.)

The

denied the motion, agreeing With the state and noting that any potential prejudice

would be addressed With a

curative instruction that the jury should consider the counts

independently. (8/13/18 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 20-25.)

On

dispute that the conduct charged as two counts

was

appeal, Grifﬁn acknowledges that he does not

“part 0f a

common plan or scheme,” and does

not dispute the state’s assertion below that the same evidence would be used t0 establish both

counts.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)

Instead,

he argues only

notwithstanding those facts, and

that,

despite the district court’s promise t0 provide a curative instruction, the potential for prejudice

required the district court to hold separate

The argument

trials for

each count.

because Grifﬁn has not carried his burden to establish any prejudice,

fails

particularly in light of his concession that the conduct in question

or plan, and that the

the motion

B.

same evidence would be used

was untimely and

Standard

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.)

this

to establish

was

part of a

common scheme

both counts. In addition, though,

Court can afﬁrm 0n that basis.

Of Review

This Court reviews the denial of a motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 14 t0 sever charges
or counts into separate trials for an abuse of discretion.

P.2d 772, 775 (1983).
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State V. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 868,

664

C.

Grifﬁn Has Not Shown That The District Court Abused

Its

Discretion

BV Denying

His

Motion T0 Bifurcate
Idaho Criminal Rule 14 governs motions to sever and provides, in relevant part:

If

it

appears that a defendant or the state

is

prejudiced by a joinder of

offenses or 0f defendants in a complaint, indictment or information, the court

order the state t0 elect between counts, grant separate

trials

0f counts,

.

may

.

or

.

provide whatever other reliefjustice requires.

“When

reviewing an order denying a severance motion, the inquiry on appeal

is

Whether

the defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted from a joint trial.”

State V. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, 227,

307 P.3d 1247, 1253

(Ct.

App. 2013). Idaho appellate

courts have identiﬁed three potential sources 0f prejudice: (a) the possibility that the jury

may

confuse and cumulate the evidence, rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated; (b) the
potential that the defendant

that the jury

may

may be confounded

conclude the defendant

is

137 Idaho 903, 908, 55 P.3d 896, 901

form 0f prejudice. (Appellant’s

(Ct.

(c) the possibility

one crime and then ﬁnd him or her guilty of

guilty of

the other simply because of his 0r her criminal disposition,

Em,

and

in presenting defenses;

i.e.

he 0r she

is

App. 2002). Grifﬁn

a bad person.

relies

m

only on this third

brief, p. 9.)

“In considering Whether to grant a motion to sever based 0n the third potential prejudice,

the court

must ﬁrst determine whether the evidence 0f the multiple alleged offenses could have

been admitted in the different

trials

had the counts been

tried separately.”

Idaho 285, 293, 411 P.3d 1186, 1194 (Ct. App. 2018). “If the answer

and a court
as t0

may properly deny the

is

State V. Williams, 163

yes, there is

n0 prejudice

motion.” Li. “In such circumstances, ‘the analysis

Whether the offenses are part of a

common scheme

is

the

same

or plan permitting joinder under

Criminal Rule 8(a) and Whether the defendant would be prejudiced by joinder because the

11

offenses were not part of a

common scheme

or plan under Evidence Rule 404(b).’” Li. (quoting

State V. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho 757, 760, 351 P.3d 1215, 1218 (2015)).

“A

show

criminal defendant bears the burden t0

under Idaho Criminal Rule 14.”

Thumm

N0. 45290, 2019

V. State,

making a motion

prejudice in

WL 3949664,

Grifﬁn did not can'y that burden below and has not carried

Aug. 22, 2019).

it

at

to sever

*4 (Idaho

0n appeal.

On

appeal, he acknowledges that he has never disputed that the acts underlying the attempted arson

counts were part of a

common scheme

same evidence would be used

or plan, nor did he dispute the state’s contention that the

both counts. (Appellant’s

to support

brief, p. 9.)

It

follows that he

did not establish prejudice and the district court could properly deny the motion.

163 Idaho

at

Nor
scheme or

293, 411 P.3d

is

there

plan,

at

that the

that, as a

matter of

fact, the

two counts were part of a common

same evidence would have been admissible

for each.

rights,

Grifﬁn told an ofﬁcer

that,

motivated by dissatisfaction with a judge, he ﬁlled a

glass bottle With gasoline at a gas station, then

County Courthouse. (8/2/17 Tn,

The two

After waiving his

counts arise out 0f conduct occurring less than twenty—four hours apart.

Miranda

Williams,

1194.

any doubt

and

E

p. 38, L. 11

lit

0n the sidewalk outside the Bannock

the bottle

— p.43,

L. 9.)

He

then told the ofﬁcer

that, early the

next morning, he went back t0 the same gas station t0 ﬁll another glass bottle with gasoline,
intending t0 d0 the same thing again.

(Id.)

A

gas station attendant saw

purchasing a small amount of gasoline the ﬁrst night (8/2/17 Tn,

with a bottle

full

0f gasoline on the second (8/2/17

suggests that Grifﬁn

was engaged

in a

dissatisfaction With, a particular judge,

brief period of time.

Tr., p. 18, L.

scheme or plan

t0

19

p. 6, L.

— p.

him on both
14

—

p. 9, L.

nights,

21) and

25, L. 14). That evidence

intimidate, or at least express

Which plan involved multiple, very similar

acts over a

Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 762, 351 P.3d at 1220 (“The events must be

12

linked

by common

instead

must obj ectively tend
Finally,

to establish that the

0n appeal, Grifﬁn merely

instruction that the district court stated

it

same person committed

asserts,

all

the acts.”).

Without substantive argument, that the

would provide would have been insufﬁcient
There

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9-10.)

prejudice.

m,

go beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and

characteristics that

is

no reason

E

to believe that is so.

m

t0 cure

any

158 Idaho 294, 299, 346 P.3d 311, 316 (Ct. App. 2015) (afﬁrming denial 0f motion t0

sever Where evidentiary issues were relatively simple and district court stated that

it

would give

an instruction t0 consider the charges separately).

D.

Grifﬁn’s Motion

A
Criminal

Was Untimely

movant requesting severance under Idaho Criminal Rule 14 must comply With Idaho
Rule

12(d),

which

requires

m0tions—”must be ﬁled within 28 days
before

whichever

is earlier.”

comply with

this rule,

trial

failure to

that

Rule

after the entry

I.C.R. 12(b)(4), (d).

7,

it

12(b)

motions—such

as

severance

of a plea 0f not guilty 0r seven days

While a court “may

relieve a party of

can only d0 so “for good cause shown 0r for excusable

neglect.” I.C.R. 12(d).

These timelines are not optional. Parties must show good cause or excusable neglect

t0

properly ﬁle a Rule 12(b) motion; otherwise, “[a]llowing untimely [Rule 12(b)] motions to be

heard because they appear meritorious eviscerates the purpose of the rule.”
Idaho 595, 597, 887 P.2d 1102,

1104

(Ct.

App. 1994).

State V. Dice, 126

Courts must therefore entertain

explanations for the delay and must “determineﬂ Whether good cause 0r excusable neglect

shown based on

the reasons given.” Li. “If n0

t0 the satisfaction

of the

district court,”

was

good cause 0r excusable neglect was established

a Rule 12(b) motion “should not [be] heard,”

13

much

less

granted.

there

Li.

And Where

a

trial

record “is devoid 0f any evidence presented

was good cause 0r excusable neglect

for the late ﬁling,” a

motion

.

Tarallo V. LaVallee, 433 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1970) (“The exigencies of a

orderly procedure require that the motion t0 sever be

Why

There seems t0 be n0 reason
before

trial.

appellant could not have

More than seven months

appellant had counsel

made

trial

at the earliest

moved

.

showing

ﬂ alﬂ

the

trial

U.S. ex

and the need for

possible

for severance

0n

moment.

this

elapsed between appellant’s indictment and the

some time before

that

to sever is appropriately

denied. State V. Egyilior, 137 Idaho 903, 908, 55 P.3d 896, 901 (Ct. App. 2002);

rel.

.

ground

trial,

and

began”).

Grifﬁn’s motion was plainly untimely under Rule 12(d) and he failed even to attempt t0

show good cause
(R., pp. 71-77.)

0r excusable neglect t0 justify the delay.

T0 be

timely, his

motion

to bifurcate should

motion a year

days. I.C.R. 12(b)(4), (d). Instead, he ﬁled his

seven days before

trial

was

set to

delay, Grifﬁn stated only that

decision to ignore a rule

is

it

begin (R.,

was a

He

p. 361-63).

“tactic.”

pled not guilty in August of 2017.

have been ﬁled within twenty—eight
later (R., pp. 397-98),

Asked by

(8/13/18 Tr., p.

5, L.

and less than

the district court about the

23 —

p. 6, L. 2.)

A tactical

manifestly not good cause or excusable neglect justifying an untimely

motion.

IV.

Grifﬁn Has Not Shown That The District Court Erred

Defense
A.

BV Excluding Evidence T0
He Did Not Have Under Idaho Law

Support

A

Introduction

The

state

moved

t0 exclude Grifﬁn’s

proposed expert Witness because the Witness was

designated to testify that “concrete cannot burn,” which the state argued

establish attempted arson,

it

did not need t0

show

14

is

irrelevant because, to

the concrete could 0r did actually burn.

(R.,

pp. 381-82; 8/13/18 Tr., p. 13, L. 23

—

14 (“there’s no element that requires that he

p. 14, L.

actually burn something 0r could actually burn something; just that he tried t0 go forward with a

plan to burn something”).) Grifﬁn responded by arguing that the testimony was relevant because

“you can’t have an attempt
15

—

p.

15, L. 2.)

That

impossibility, according t0

been completed. The
the

comments

commit a crime

t0

is,

that cannot

be committed.” (8/13/18

Tr., p.

14, L.

Grifﬁn argued that the evidence was relevant to a defense of

which he could not be

guilty 0f attempting a crime that could not

View and granted the

district court rejected that

to Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1451

State V. Curtiss, 138 Idaho 466, 65 P.3d

207

defense of impossibility to an attempt charge.

state’s

motion, relying on

and the cases cited therein—including

App. 2002)—to conclude

(Ct.

have

(8/13/18 Tr., p. 23, L. 15

—

that there is

p. 24, L. 15.)

n0

That

conclusion was mandated by Idaho law.

B.

Standard of Review

“‘The

trial

court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion 0f evidence and

decision t0 admit evidence Will be reversed only

discretion.”’

State V. Folk, 162 Idaho 620, 625,

When

there has

m

been a clear abuse 0f

402 P.3d 1073, 1078 (2017) (quoting

its

that

Lopez-Orozco, 159 Idaho 375, 377, 360 P.3d 1056, 1058 (2015)).

C.

Because There

Is

N0

Impossibility Defense

T0 An Attempt Charge, The Evidence Was

Properly Excluded

The

district court

properly excluded evidence regarding the combustibility of cement that

Grifﬁn was attempting to introduce only t0 support a purported impossibility defense. As Idaho

law does not provide for an impossibility defense
irrelevant.

15

to

an attempt charge, the evidence was

As Grifﬁn

afﬁrmed the conclusion

notes, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly

no impossibility defense

to

an attempt charge under Idaho law.

that there is

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)

In

CLiss,

the court rejected the proposition that an impossibility defense should be written in t0

Idaho’s

attempt statute, LC.

§

18-306, Which “encompasses both the deﬁnition and the

punishment for the crime of attempt.

In that section, the Idaho legislature has speciﬁcally

Who

provided for the punishment of individuals
preparation to

commit

statute provides

unaware 0f some
“That

it

for those

who

.

.

intend to

miss,

the crime, but fail.”

no exception

.

commit a crime,

138 Idaho

commit a crime but

intend t0

might be legally 0r factually impossible for an individual
is

jurisdictions endorsing the

following year in State

irrelevant

to

same View).

V. Glass,

Cir.

Li.

fail

the intended crime.” Li.

(collecting

consummate

Egg United

(Ct.

the

cases from other

The Court of Appeals then reafﬁrmed

E,

“The

because they were

to ultimately

139 Idaho 815, 818, 87 P.3d 302, 305

Idaho unique 0r an outlier in this regard.

1254-55 (9th

analysis.”

the

beyond mere

469, 65 P.3d at 210.

would have prevented them from completing

fact that

underlying crime itself

at

act

that

View the

App. 2003). Nor

States V. Olliiada,

is

588 F-Zd 1253,

1978) (rejecting impossibility as a defense t0 attempt); People

V.

Thousand,

631 N.W.2d 694, 700-03 (Mich. 2001) (same).

Grifﬁn does not argue that Curtiss 0r Glass were incorrectly decided or that they d0 not
control the district court’s determination below.

court abused

its

discretion.
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He

has therefore not shown that the

district

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

DATED this

Court afﬁrm the

district court.

11th day of October, 2019.

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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